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abstract
This paper presents an empirical research on how monetary policy can affect 
income distribution. After describing the channels through which monetary 
policy may have an impact on income distribution, we perform a panel analysis 
of 15 EU (European Union) countries covering the period 1995-2014. The 
results provide evidence of a significant positive relationship between real 
interest rates and income inequality measured as the Gini coefficient. However, 
this relationship only becomes significant in the medium term but not in the 
short term. Our findings call for greater attention by central bankers to the 
redistributive effects of monetary policy.
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resuMen
Este artículo presenta una investigación empírica sobre cómo la política 
monetaria puede afectar a la distribución del ingreso. Tras describir los 
canales a través de los cuales la política monetaria puede tener un impacto 
en la distribución de la renta, se realiza un análisis para un panel de 15 países 
de la UE (Unión Europea) que abarca el período 1995-2014. Los resultados 
evidencian una relación positiva significativa entre los tipos de interés reales y 
la desigualdad de ingresos medida como el coeficiente de Gini. Sin embargo, 
esta relación sólo es significativa a medio plazo, pero no a corto plazo. Nuestros 
resultados plantean que los bancos centrales tengan en consideración los 
efectos redistributivos de la política monetaria.
Palabras clave: coeficiente de Gini; desigualdad de ingresos; política 
monetaria; análisis de datos panel; tipos de interés reales.
Clasificación JEL / JEL classification: D31; E58.
Revista de economía mundial 55, 2020, 121-142
1. introduction1
According to several reports from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the gap between the highest and 
lowest income groups in OECD member countries has been growing steadily 
for more than three decades, a trend that has accelerated since 2008, after 
the outbreak of the global financial crisis (OECD, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014a, 
b, and c).
The worsening of this problem has converted it into one of the most 
debated issues in the economic literature of recent years, and it has been 
frequently associated with the increase in the “skill premium” that separates 
skilled and unskilled workers –a factor that, combined with other processes 
related to the economic and financial globalization, has led high-skilled workers 
to benefit from the opportunities derived from the global market, while low-
skilled workers are forced to compete internationally for ever lower-paying jobs 
with less bargaining power.
Thus, most studies on the causes of increasing inequality have focused on 
the following factors: globalization (Wood, 1995; Feenstra and Hanson, 2001; 
Meschi and Vivarelli, 2009; Bergh and Nilsson, 2010; Jaumotte et al., 2013; 
Asteriou et al., 2014); technological change, giving special attention to the 
impact of information and communication technologies (ICTs), and its relation 
with the educational level of the population (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz 
and Murphy, 1992; Acemoglu, 1998; Krusell et al., 2000; Card and DiNardo, 
2002); the change of social norms on wage inequality (Piketty and Saez, 2006; 
Atkinson, 2008; Bakija et al., 2012); the growth of the financial sector (Beck 
et al., 2007; Jaumotte et al., 2013; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Van 
Arnum and Naples, 2013; Denk and Cournède, 2015); the loss of the political 
and social status of trade unions (DiNardo et al., 1996; Acemoglu et al., 2001; 
Card, 2001); and the effect of redistributive fiscal policies (Alesina and Perotti, 
1996; Bastagli, 2012; Joumard et al., 2012).
Similarly, much research has been carried out in order to analyze the 
effects of inequality on economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson 
and Tabellini, 1994; Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000; Piketty and Saez, 2006), 
household debt levels (Lacovello, 2008; Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Rajan, 2011; 
1 This research was supported by the Xunta de Galicia (ED481A-2016/356) and the Ministerio de 
Economía y Competitividad (Government of Spain - Grant no. CSO2017-86178-R).
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Paz-Pardo and Sánchez-Santos, 2014), socio-political stability and social 
cohesion (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Kawachi and Kennedy, 1997; Putnam, 
2000; Stiglitz, 2012), crime and violence (Neapolitan, 1999; Daly et al., 2000; 
Fajnzylber et al., 2002), or life expectancy (Wilkinson, 1997; Kawachi and 
Kennedy, 1999; Lynch et al., 2000).
However, after the outbreak of the global financial crisis started in 2008, 
a factor that had traditionally stayed in the background began to attract 
researchers’ attention: monetary policy. Although the channels through which 
this policy may affect income and wealth distribution may seem less intuitive 
at first glance than those of the factors mentioned above, their influence on the 
evolution of inequality cannot not be ignored.
Accordingly, some recent studies (Saiki and Frost, 2014; Bivens, 2015; 
Doepke et al., 2015; Cloyne and Hürtgen, 2016; Domanski et al., 2016; Auclert, 
2017; Coibion et al., 2017; Mumtaz and Theophilopoulou, 2017; Furceri et 
al., 2018) and monetary policy-makers (Coeuré, 2012; Bullard, 2014; Yellen, 
2014; Panetta, 2015; Draghi, 2016) have emphasized the importance of the 
effects that monetary policy can have on income and wealth distribution. All 
this highlights the undeniable interest of the study of this matter.
Nevertheless, before attempting to quantify the effects that monetary 
policy can have on inequality, it is necessary to examine the channels through 
which these effects can be transmitted. Coibion et al. (2017) suggest the 
following five channels. First, the income composition channel: the diverse 
composition of the incomes of the different groups of households according 
to their source will cause that, if the effects of monetary policy on labor and 
capital income are not the same, the monetary policies may impinge on income 
inequality. Second, the financial segmentation channel: if some agents trade 
in financial markets more frequently and are more rapidly affected by changes 
in the money supply, some monetary policies may redistribute wealth for their 
benefit. Therefore, these policies would not only have a clear impact on income 
inequality but also on consumption inequality. Third, the portfolio channel: it 
works in the same way as the income composition channel but for the portfolio 
of real and financial assets held by households. It may affect wealth distribution 
instead of income distribution. Fourth, the savings redistribution channel: an 
unexpected increase in interest rates or a drop in inflation will benefit savers 
and harm debtors. Considering that households with higher income levels 
tend to act as lenders for those at the other end of the distribution, monetary 
policies that could cause such consequences will increase the gap between 
both groups. Finally, we have the earnings heterogeneity channel: labor 
earnings are the main source of income for most households and this type of 
income will respond differently to monetary policies depending on the position 
of each household in the income distribution. The greater pro-cyclicality of 
employment and wages for low-income households –which are also the 
most dependent on wages as a source of income– will lead to an unequal 
transmission of the effects of monetary policy to the different income groups.
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Hence, the fact that the same monetary policy can cause –through the 
aforementioned five channels– effects of different magnitude and opposite 
direction on income, wealth and consumption inequality makes the net impact 
on these variables uncertain a priori. For these reasons, the purpose of this 
paper is to assess empirically the link between monetary policy and income 
distribution for the EU-15 countries throughout the period 1995-2014. In so 
far as the aforementioned channels, from a theoretical perspective, do not 
provide any conclusive prediction, it is necessary to assess the relationship 
between monetary policy and inequality through data analysis.
One of the most controversial issues related to the unconventional monetary 
policies implemented by some of the world’s main monetary authorities in 
response to the last financial crisis is their potential influence on income and 
wealth inequality. This proves how relevant is the topic we address in this paper. 
In fact, providing evidence about this influence becomes especially important, 
mainly due to the agreement of a number of democratic societies to delegate 
in non-elected central bankers the implementation of monetary policy and, 
particularly, the power of setting interest rates. Within such a framework, 
central banks must improve their understanding of how monetary policy can 
affect income distribution and particularly the association between monetary 
stability and inequality.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the dependent 
and independent variables included in our model, the justification of their 
inclusion and their main descriptive statistics. In section 3, we present and 
justify the econometric methods used, and we also show the results of our 
analysis. In section 4, we discuss the main results derived from the econometric 
analysis and their implications. Finally, section 5 summarizes the conclusions 
of our paper.
2. variables
Starting from a survey of the literature, in this section we present the variables 
selected for studying the effects of monetary policy on income inequality. At 
the end of this section, we include a table with the main descriptive statistics, 
as well as the data sources.
As for the dependent variables, we use the following two: The Gini coefficient 
of equalized disposable income (GINI) and the Gini coefficient of equalized 
disposable income before social transfers (including pensions) (MARKETGINI) 
as a proxy of net income inequality and market income inequality, respectively.
Despite its limitations (Atkinson, 1970; De Maio, 2007; Palma, 2011; 
Martín-Legendre, 2018), the Gini coefficient is the most used measure to 
quantify inequality in a population, because it allows to summarize in a number 
between 0 and 100 the way a certain variable (income, wealth, consumption, 
etc.) is distributed among all the members of such population.
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The measure of inequality is nonetheless a very complex task, which 
means there is no single indicator that can cover all the inequality dimensions. 
Consequently, in order to make the results as consistent as possible and 
to ensure more sensitivity to changes at the ends of the distribution, two 
additional dependent variables were included in the model: on the one hand, 
the Palma ratio (PALMA), which is defined as the ratio of the richest 10% of 
the population’s share of gross national income, divided by the poorest 40% of 
the population’s share; on the other hand, the S80/S20 ratio (S80S20), which 
is defined as the ratio of the richest 20% of the population’s share of gross 
national income, divided by the poorest 20% of the population’s share.
We decided to include these last two measures to correct the relative 
“insensitivity” of the Gini coefficients to changes at the ends of the distribution, 
which are the most volatile segments, although it is also worth mentioning that 
this second set of variables does not adequately measure income inequality 
–they measure income polarization– since they exclude 50% and 60% of the 
population in their calculation, respectively.
Regarding the independent variables, we considered appropriate to include 
the following ones, which are discussed below: monetary policy, growth of 
financial sector, trade openness, technological change, redistributive policies, 
tertiary education, sectoral structure of employment, trade union influence –
and the lack of thereof–, aging of the population, and structural unemployment 
–these last three explanatory variables do not appear in previous models to 
explain the behavior of income inequality; the justification for their inclusion is 
detailed afterwards.
Monetary policy: To proxy this variable, we use the real interest rates 
calculated as the nominal interest rate of the interbank market at 12 months 
minus the domestic consumer price index (YRIR). However, considering that 
monetary policy impulses are transmitted with a certain delay to the real 
economy and, ultimately, the income distribution, we include both the level 
variable (YRIR) and its first lag (L1_YRIR).
These variables have been widely used in the literature as a proxy for 
monetary policy (Fazzari, 1993; Passamani and Tamborini, 2007; Dickens, 
2016). Real interest rates –which can be defined either ex-ante or ex-post– are 
a relevant indicator to assess the looseness of monetary conditions. On the one 
hand, the ex-ante interest rates try to measure the yield or the expected actual 
cost over the time-horizon of an active or passive transaction. On the other 
hand, the ex-post interest rates refer to the actual cost or yield finally obtained 
when the operations have expired. In terms of spending decisions, the main 
thing is the ex-ante rate, although usually it is not observable. For this reason, 
the most common approach is to subtract from the nominal interest rate an 
expected inflation measure over the time-horizon of the instrument, which 
can be approximated by means of different procedures –moving averages 
of observed inflation rates, statistical or econometric methods based on the 
analysis of time series or on multivariate behavioral relations, or analysts’ 
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expectations, such as those published by Consensus Economics (Research 
Service of the Bank of Spain, 2005).
For short terms, the different approaches often produce similar results. For 
longer terms, however, there will be more uncertainty in determining the level 
and evolution of real interest rates. In this case, another alternative indicator 
used sometimes is the yield of inflation-indexed bonds. In the Eurozone, since 
1999 a growing number of sovereign issuers are being financed by these 
instruments. Anyway, this last indicator is not without its problems. On the one 
hand, the possible existence of an illiquidity premium, given the low liquidity 
of these instruments, could bias the level of real interest rates upwards. On the 
other hand, the asymmetric compensation of inflation in these products will 
tend to introduce a downward bias.
As a final point, it should be noted that, after the introduction of the euro 
in 1999, twelve out of fifteen countries included in the sample transferred 
their sovereignty in monetary policy matters to the European Central Bank. 
But in spite of the common monetary policy implemented by the ECB, the real 
interest rates of each Eurozone country evolved differently as a result of the 
unequal inflation levels faced by every country in the sample.
Growth of financial sector: The growth of financial services could have had 
an impact on the income distribution through several channels. On the one 
hand, widespread access to financial services may have reduced inequality 
by favoring a better allocation of resources that allows individuals to plan for 
the long term, and better adapt to short-term shocks. However, most wealthy 
people own a high proportion of financial assets, which implies they become 
much more favored than the rest of the population by the growth of the financial 
sector (Van Arnum and Naples, 2013). In addition, this increase in income 
inequality could be amplified by the growth in size of the financial sector –
an increasingly skill-intensive sector–, widening the gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers (Philippon and Reshef, 2007).
As a proxy for the access to financial services –or “financial deepening”– 
we use the domestic credit to the private sector measured as a share of gross 
domestic product: CREDIT (Dabla-Norris et al., 2014). It should be noted 
that in another context, if we were talking about developing or Third World 
countries, the appropriate variable would be, e.g., the percentage of adults 
with a bank account.
As a proxy for the behavior of the capital markets, we use share price 
indices, calculated from the prices of common shares of companies traded on 
national or foreign stock exchanges (SHAREPRICES).
Finally, the inclusion of two variables to measure the size of the financial 
sector were considered: value added by the financial sector as a share of 
gross domestic product, and net foreign assets as a share of gross domestic 
product. But both were finally excluded from the model due to their high 
correlation (> 80%) with TRADE (Trade Openess).
Trade openness: The increase in international trade over the last decades 
has allowed companies to incorporate technology more easily in order to save 
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time and labor, or to relocate their activity in regions where production costs are 
much lower (Dabla-Norris et al., 2014). This new scenario has contributed to 
the reduction of inequality between countries, but it has particularly punished 
the working classes of the industrialized countries, so globalization could be 
considered as one of the main causes of the increase of income inequality in 
these countries (Bergh and Nilsson, 2010). Despite this, the net effects of trade 
liberalization on income distribution are, a priori, unknown considering that the 
increase of this variable promotes the economic growth, and could contribute 
to the rise of real wages due to the cheapening of importations (Dabla-Norris 
et al., 2014).
As a proxy for this variable, we use the sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product (TRADE).
Technological change: Literature suggests that a skill-biased technological 
change may have contributed to increase the skill-premium in developed 
countries and, as a result, income inequality (Acemoglu, 1998). The 
incorporation of new technologies into production processes –accelerated 
by the progressive elimination of barriers to trade– is complemented by the 
specialized training acquired by skilled workers, aimed at the performance of 
non-routine tasks, while it destroys jobs of unskilled workers who carry out 
repetitive tasks. This process favors the widening of the wage gap between 
both groups of workers, and, ultimately, is another key factor for explaining the 
increase in income inequality (Acemoglu, 1998).
As a proxy for long-term technological change, we use total factor 
productivity (TFP).
Tertiary education: As a result of technological change and globalization, 
the demand of skilled workers have increased remarkably, raising the skill-
premium and widening the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers 
(Autor et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the fact that the relative size of both groups 
and the income distribution within them can change over time makes the net 
effects of changes that educational attainment has on inequality unknown a 
priori.
In order to approximate this variable, we took into account the UNESCO 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), which decomposes 
the level of educational attainment into nine categories from 0: Pre-primary 
education, to 8: Doctorate or equivalent.
Following the aforementioned classification, we use as a proxy for this 
variable population aged 15–64 with tertiary educational attainment (levels 
5-8) as a share of total population aged 15-64 (UNIV).
Redistributive fiscal policies: In recent years, the gradual abandonment 
of tax and expenditure redistributive policies aimed at correcting the market 
income distribution may have played a key role in the increase of the inequality 
experienced by the countries under analysis (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; 
Bastagli, 2012; Joumard et al., 2012).
As a proxy for this variable, we use total social expenditure as a share of 
gross domestic product (SOCX).
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Sectoral structure of employment: This variable seeks to approximate 
the level of prevalence of the service sector over the industry sector in terms 
of employment, in order to measure the effect that the tertiarization of the 
European economy may have had on income inequality –considering the 
primary sector contribution to the economy of the countries under analysis 
is negligible.
As a proxy for this variable, we use the difference between employment 
in services and employment in industry, both expressed as a share of total 
employment (DIF_SERIND).
The sectoral structure of employment is typically included as a control 
variable, but not presented in the same way we did.
Influence of trade unions: The loss of political influence by trade unions, 
which for decades helped to counteract the income accumulation of the higher-
income groups, may have had a direct impact on inequality, contributing to its 
increase (DiNardo et al., 1996; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Card, 2001).
Two variables can be used as proxies for this process: the workers’ level 
of union protection in a given country, and the lack of thereof. Respectively: 
trade union density (UNION), which corresponds to the ratio of wage and 
salary earners who are trade union members, regarding the total number of 
wage and salary earners, and (ii) self-employment as a percentage of total 
employment (SELFEMP). In relation to this, self-employed workers are those 
workers who, working on their own account or with one or a few partners or 
in cooperative, hold the type of jobs defined as “self-employment jobs”, i.e. 
jobs where the remuneration directly depends on the profits derived from 
the goods and services produced. Self-employed workers include four sub-
categories: employers, own-account workers, members of cooperatives, and 
contributing family workers.
Ageing of the population: In a region like the EU-15, where demographic 
ageing is becoming an increasingly important issue, it may be questioned 
whether the demographic structure has any significant effect on income 
distribution.
As a proxy for this variable, whose inclusion is unprecedented in the 
literature consulted, we use the third age population (age ≥ 65 years) as a 
percentage of the total population (POPOVER65).
Structural unemployment: The risk of exclusion from the labor market 
suffered by many citizens who have been unemployed for long periods could 
have had a clear impact on the increase of the variables used to measure 
inequality. In addition, it would be interesting to compare southern and 
northern countries, where long-term unemployment is a problem of varying 
magnitude.
As a proxy for this variable, which does not appear in the literature 
consulted as a factor that could explain the behavior of income inequality, 
we use the long-term unemployment rate as a share of total unemployment 
(LTUNEM_U).
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The sample consists of an unbalanced panel of annual data for the EU-
15 countries throughout the period 1995-2014. The EU-15 is the group of 
member countries of the European Union prior to the accession of ten candidate 
countries on 1 May 2004, and is comprised the following 15 countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
The countries and the period of analysis chosen are due to data availability 
for constructing a panel with the highest number of observations.
After discussing all the variables included in our model, we show their main 
descriptive statistics in Table 1.
table 1. Main descriPtive statistics
Variable Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GINI Eurostat 271 29.1704 3.8483 20.0 38.1
MARKETGINI Eurostat 168 49.1291 3.8555 43.2 61.6
PALMA Eurostat 258 1.0833 .20739 .73076 1.6927
S80S20 Eurostat 272 4.6198 1.0221 2.9 7.4
YRIR Eurostat/OECD 299 1.2052 1.8171 -3.3629 6.8648
TRADE World Bank 300 96.9492 63.8998 37.1078 374.1478
CREDIT World Bank 273 99.4304 37.8581 28.8760 202.1896
SHAREPRICES OECD 296 102.2412 43.3882 27.4644 297.8090
TFP AMECO 300 98.3432 4.9556 78.3942 111.8734
UNIV Eurostat 291 22.0793 7.2097 6 39.6
SOCX OECD 300 24.3623 4.0292 13.1300 31.9526
DIF_SERIND World Bank 300 44.6246 10.6425 16.0000 74.8999
UNION OECD 286 37.6110 20.9830 7.5476 83.1381
SELFEMP World Bank 300 16.6103 8.0754 6.5 46.1
POPOVER65 World Bank 300 16.3512 2.2745 10.5193 22.0141
LTUNEM_U World Bank 295 37.5993 13.5375 9.5 73.5
Source: Own elaboration.
3. Model and results
The Blundell-Bond method is the approach that, in principle, would seem 
optimal for the purposes of our research, as it corresponds to a dynamic 
panel model and allows us to address the problem of endogeneity derived 
from three causes: omitted variables (fixed effects associated with individuals), 
simultaneity (possibility that not only the explanatory variables influence 
the dependent variable, but also, at the same time, the latter, in turn, has an 
impact on them) and dynamic endogeneity (derived from the inclusion of a lag 
of the dependent variable as a regressor). 
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However, this method is not applicable to our analysis of the EU-15, as it 
requires panels of the type “large N, small T”, when the EU panel is of the type 
“small N, small T” (N = number of subjects, in this case countries; T = number 
of periods; N is considered to be large if greater than 20, and T is large if greater 
than 30).
Taking into account the two previous points, in order to control the possible 
effects of factors not captured by the explanatory variables of our econometric 
model, and face possible endogeneity problems, in the case of the EU-15 
analysis we chose to use then a two-way fixed effects model, which solves the 
first question. Once the estimate was made, we applied the Wooldridge (2010) 
exogeneity test, to make sure that the second problem we pointed out was not 
present and, in short, that the estimates of the two-way fixed effects model 
were valid.
Our model can be written as follows:
[1]
In this model, we use a two-way fixed effects model, where country dummy 
variables (β0i) collect the implicit differences between economies, and time 
dummy variables (β1t) pick up the impact of shocks that are common to all the 
countries in the sample.
It should be noted that, since none of the dependent variables passed the 
normality test, we transformed them by taking natural logarithms. We also 
transformed SHAREPRICES and TFP by taking natural logarithms since both 
variables were originally indices numbers, hindering the interpretation of the 
results. Finally, UNIV and POPOVER65 turned out to have a problem of non-
stationarity –individual unit roots and common unit root, respectively– that 
was corrected by taking first differences of the original variables. 
The normality and stationarity of the data were verified by means of the 
tests of Shapiro-Wilk, and Levin, Lin & Chu, and ADF Fisher, respectively.
The data panel poses two problems that had to be corrected before 
estimating the model: autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, detected by 
means of the Wooldridge test and the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
test, respectively. We also applied the Pesaran, Friedman and Frees tests, 
resulting in contemporaneous correlation, i.e. cross-sectional dependence.
All these problems can be corrected simultaneously using the Panel-
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE), which is a more accurate method than 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) (Beck and Katz, 1995; for more 
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details on both methods, see e.g. Greene, 2012). This method is adequate for 
linear cross-sectional time series models where the parameters are estimated 
by either OLS or Prais–Winsten regression (Prais and Winsten, 1954), 
which was the approach used here. We assume that (i) there is first-order 
autocorrelation AR(1) within the panels, (ii) the coefficient of the AR(1) process 
is panel-specific, and (iii) the disturbances are panel-level heteroskedastic only, 
with no contemporaneous correlation across panels.
The Pearson correlation coefficient revealed that in no case the variable 
selected reached a correlation above 60 percent –except for LTUNEM_U and 
SELFEMP, which have a correlation coefficient of 0.6180.
The estimates obtained are shown in Tables 2 and 3 (in brackets, standard 
errors). Country and time fixed effects were significant for all the cases.
table 2. Pooled ols estiMation results
LN_GINI LN_MARKETGINI LN_PALMA LN_S80S20
YRIR -.00570
(.00444)
-.00022
(.00430)
-.00720
(.00645)
-.00502
(.00647)
L1_YRIR .00134
(.0042)
.00245
(.00433)
-.00243
(.00618)
-.00517
(.00614)
CREDIT .00115***
(.00014)
.00054***
(.00014)
.00167***
(.00021)
.00198***
(.00021)
LN_SHAREPRICES -.01957
(.01552)
.03042
(.02272)
-.05823**
(.02334)
-.08524***
(.02250)
TRADE -.00009
(.00011)
-.00042***
(.00009)
-.00009
(.00016)
-.00018
(.00016)
LN_TFP .19762
(.12775)
-.57774**
(.22933)
.35798*
(.19537)
.51727***
(.18612)
D1_UNIV .00235
(.00389)
.00616
(.00439)
.00484
(.00604)
.00083
(.00566)
SOCX -.00725***
(.00172)
- -.00915***
(.00256)
-.00897***
(.00250)
DIF_SERIND -.00058
(.00066)
.00222***
(.00068)
-.00179*
(.00097)
-.00114
(.00094)
UNION -.0021***
(.00027)
.00029
(.00027)
-.00271***
(.00041)
-.00272***
(.00040)
SELFEMP .00673***
(.00094)
-.00168*
(.00087)
.01052***
(.00138)
.01422***
(.00137)
D1_POPOVER65 -.07870**
(.03349)
.01790
(.03214)
-.16210***
(.05045)
-.15641***
(.04878)
LTUNEM_U .00197***
(.00051)
.00361***
(.00053)
.00287***
(.00075)
.00283***
(.00074)
Obs. 203 149 191 204
Source: Own elaboration.
Note: ***, **, * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of 
significance, respectively.
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table 3. two-way fixed effects estiMation results
LN_GINI LN_MARKETGINI LN_PALMA LN_S80S20
YRIR .00065
(.00266)
.00308
(.00266)
-.00037
(.00419)
.00178
(.00414)
L1_YRIR .00706***
(.00267)
.00810***
(.00281)
.01169***
(.00423)
.00511
(.00423)
CREDIT .00045**
(.00021)
.00032
(.00023)
-.00006
(.00039)
.00057*
(.00033)
LN_SHAREPRICES .04878***
(.01425)
.01746
(.02794)
.03351
(.02426)
.04876**
(.02329)
TRADE -.00111***
(.00028)
-.00100***
(.00033)
-.00202***
(.00048)
-.00139***
(.00046)
LN_TFP -.16266
(.11332)
-.29068
(.22399)
-.37178**
(.17567)
-.29152
(.17880)
D1_UNIV -.00277*
(.00154)
-.00120
(.00227)
-.00223
(.00217)
-.00362
(.00254)
SOCX -.01631***
(.00270)
- -.01883***
(.00436)
-.02629***
(.00415)
DIF_SERIND .00366**
(.00150)
.00481***
(.00180)
.00456*
(.00244)
.00793***
(.00252)
UNION .00023
(.00143)
-.01506***
(.00225)
-.00343
(.00251)
.00333
(.00231)
SELFEMP .01117***
(.00305)
.00707*
(.00406)
.01800***
(.00447)
.01223***
(.00456)
D1_POPOVER65 -.01842
(.03600)
-.01959
(.03196)
-.07136
(.05068)
.03418
(.05580)
LTUNEM_U .00112
(.00066)
.00166**
(.00074)
.00109
(.00106)
.00085
(.00104)
Obs. 203 149 191 204
Source: Own elaboration.
Note: ***, **, * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels of 
significance, respectively.
4. discussion of results
The results obtained reveal that, first, the variable used as a proxy for 
monetary policy –namely, the real interest (YRIR)– is not significant to explain 
any of the dependent variables selected. Nevertheless, it is extremely significant 
(p-value > 0.01) to explain three of the dependent variables when we include it 
with a one-year lag (L1_YRIR). We can also note that it ceases to be significant if 
we incorporate lags longer than one year: L2_YRIR, L3_YRIR, etc.
The relationship between real interest rates and income inequality is 
significant regardless of the indicator used to measure inequality –with the 
exception of the S80/S20 ratio. In this latter case, the sign of the coefficient 
is also positive but not significant. In order to interpret this result, it should 
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be taken into account that this indicator is a quantile ratio measuring the gap 
between the rich and the poor, that is, it measures the distance between the 
ends of the distribution. Therefore, this indicator could suffer from a problem 
of lack of generality when measuring the evolution of inequality, given that only 
the income received by the top and bottom income quintiles is considered in its 
calculation. This evidence would be consistent with the idea that the effects of 
monetary policy may not manifest themselves in the difference between the first 
and last quintile, that display particular behaviours derived from their extreme 
position in the income distribution, but in other sections of income distribution.
To explain these results, we may infer that the macroeconomic effects 
caused by low interest rates –a stronger aggregate demand, a faster fall in 
unemployment and medium-term price stability– have positive distributional 
effects over the medium term, while the potential negative effects in short-
term inequality (less than a year), caused by the noticeable effects of 
expansionary monetary policy on financial asset prices, are not significant 
to explain the evolution of any income inequality indicator. In the end, our 
results reinforce a recent speech delivered by Mario Draghi (2016, p. 8) 
where he pointed out that “over the medium-term, it is unambiguous that 
monetary policy has positive distributional effects through macroeconomic 
channels”.
Second, regarding the growth of the financial sector, both variables 
included to analyze the effects of such growth are significant to explain the 
increase of income inequality measured as LN_GINI, while the other three 
dependent variables show a consistent sign but different levels of significance. 
In cases where these variables are significant, their sign is also consistent with 
the results presented in the literature consulted, and this could be explained as 
follows: on the one hand, financial deepening (CREDIT) contributes to increase 
income inequality, according to the most common explanation, which would 
be more suitable for developing countries where domestic credit is largely 
concentrated on big companies and rich households, while the rest of the 
population is financially excluded. However, for the countries analyzed (EU-
15), it seems that there is not a clear explanation for these results. On the 
other hand, as regards the behavior of capital markets (LN_SHAREPRICES), 
considering that most of financial wealth in concentrated on high income 
households, the substantial increases experienced by stock indices during the 
period of analysis have caused the stockholders to progressively separate from 
the rest of the population in terms of income and wealth.
Third, the trade openness variable (TRADE) is significant to explain all the 
selected dependent variables. Considering that the effect of the level of trade 
openness on income distribution is a priori unknown –in accordance with what 
was explained in section 2–, the fact that this variable has a negative sign does 
not contradict previous empirical evidence.
Regarding technological change, the variable LN_TFP is not significant 
to explain the behavior of the two Gini indices, nor the S80/S20 ratio. This 
could mean that technological change affects households at the ends of the 
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income distribution, while it has no demonstrable impact on those at the 
center of it. Unlike previous literature, the effect of technological change 
on income inequality has a negative sign in our case of analysis. In order 
to explain this sign, it may be necessary to take into account that TFP can 
be disaggregated into “growth into technological progress” and “changes in 
technical efficiency”, so it is possible that technological progress contributes 
to increasing inequality, but this increase becomes neutralized by the changes 
in technical efficiency.
As for educational gap, the first difference of UNIV is only significant 
to explain the behavior of GINI –with a negative sign. Perhaps, this is due 
to the speed of the broadening of the gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers.
With regard to redistributive fiscal policies, the variable SOCX is –along with 
TRADE– the only variable significant at the 99% confidence level for all the 
dependent variables. Therefore, its contribution to reduce income inequality 
seems unquestionable.
As regards the sectoral structure of employment, the variable DIF_SERIND 
is significant to explain the behavior of all the dependent variables, although 
with different significance levels. Its sign is positive in all cases, which would 
mean that a greater tertiarization of these economies contributes to the 
deterioration of their income distributions. The worse working conditions 
characteristic of the service sector (more temporary contracts, lower wages...) 
compared to the industrial sector may be behind this adverse effect.
In relation to the influence of trade unions, the variable UNION is not 
significant to explain the behavior of any of the dependent variables, except for 
LN_MARKETGINI. In this case, its effect on income distribution has a negative 
sign, which fits perfectly with the literature consulted –a greater level of 
unionization implies lower income inequality. Accordingly, on the one hand, the 
sharp fall in the unionization rate experienced by thirteen of the fifteen countries 
in the sample –the only two where the unionization grew are Belgium and Spain– 
would be irrelevant to explain the generalized increase in net income inequality. 
On the other hand, the self-employment variable (SELFEMP) is significant to 
explain the behavior of LN_GINI and the two ratios –although it cannot be 
used to explain LN_MARKETGINI. In the cases where it is significant, it has a 
positive sign, which seems to confirm its usefulness to approximate the lack of 
trade union protection. If so, the interpretation would be consistent with that of 
UNION: lower levels of unionization reduce the bargaining power of workers, and 
ultimately lead to an increase in income inequality. It should be noted that the 
rate of self-employment fell in all countries over the analyzed period –except for 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In regard to the possible influence of demographic aging of the European 
population, the variable D1_POPOVER65 is not significant to explain the 
behavior of any of the selected dependent variables.
The structural unemployment variable (LTUNEM_U) is only significant to 
explain the behavior of the Gini coefficient before transfers. Although these 
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results are reasonable –a higher percentage of long-term unemployment implies 
greater market income inequality, but it does not have a significant impact on 
net income inequality because of the damping effect of the public transfers 
programs–, we cannot make comparisons about further interpretations, since 
in the literature there is no precedent of the inclusion of this variable in models 
used to explain income distribution.
Finally, it is important to note that in the results obtained for the pooled 
OLS estimation (Table 2), it can be observed that our monetary policy variable 
(L1_YRIR) is not significant to explain the behavior of any of the selected 
dependent variables. But once we change to the two-way fixed effects method, 
they become extremely significant –it should also be noted that, according to 
the results of the F-test, we can reject the null hypothesis that all the dummy 
variables are jointly not significant, and therefore, we can conclude that it is 
preferable to use the two-way fixed effects estimation method instead of a 
pooled OLS regression.
The joint significance of the dummy variables indicates there may be 
country-specific idiosyncratic variables that have a significant impact on income 
distribution and were not selected as independent variable. These results 
suggest that there are country and year-specific omitted variables that make 
our monetary policy variable not significant in a pooled OLS estimation, and 
that once these omitted variables are collected in the dummies, our monetary 
policy variable becomes highly significant.
5. conclusions
In this paper, we explore the relationship between monetary policy and income 
inequality for a sample of fifteen European countries. We have offered new evidence 
on the effects of monetary policy considering several inequality indicators (Gini, 
Palma ratio, S80/S20) and distinguishing short and medium term effects.
Our results suggest that monetary policy decisions adopted by the central 
banks of the countries analyzed have had a significant effect on income 
distribution. More specifically, the redistributive effects that an expansive 
monetary policy may have in the short term through financial channels are 
not significant, while its effects in the medium term (one-year lag) through 
macroeconomic channels are unequivocally positive, since drops in real interest 
rates contribute to reduce income inequality. Hence, our findings support 
the view of some central bankers arguing that over the medium term, it is 
unambiguous that monetary policy has positive distributional effects through 
macroeconomic channels (i.e. Draghi, 2016).
Conversely, the association between monetary policy and income 
polarization proxied by the S80/S20 ratio is not unambiguous. The sign of the 
coefficient is positive in line with the case of other indices (Gini and Palma) but 
not significant. It seems that monetary policy affects to a lesser extent to the 
distance between the richest and the poorest, the most volatile segments. So, 
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a reduction in income polarization should not necessarily be expected as a 
result of unconventional monetary policies.
As for the rest of explanatory variables, the results are generally consistent 
with the expected ones. For instance, trade openness and social expenditure 
have a clear positive effect in reducing inequality, while technological change 
also contributes to a reduction in income inequality, although our results are 
not conclusive in this regard. By contrast, the tertiarization of these economies 
has negative effects on income distribution, since a greater prevalence of the 
service sector over industry induces a greater level of income inequality. Other 
variables such as financialization, the loss of influence of trade unions, and 
structural unemployment also contribute to increasing income inequality, 
although the results are not so conclusive.
The empirical evidence provided by the present study provides an argument 
in favour of the idea that central bankers should not overlook the unintended 
redistributive consequences of their policies. Particularly, authors such as De 
Haan and Eijffinger (2017) argue that the assumption that monetary policy 
has little or no redistributive consequences is crucial for arguments in favour of 
central bank independence. In this sense, it worth to note that if apart from price 
stability, central banks assume further tasks such as financial stability and, on 
the other hand, the unconventional monetary policy measures adopted by the 
major central banks in the period since 2008 are far more redistributive than 
traditional monetary policy, the rationale of the independence of central banks 
should be revisited. However, a closer attention to inequality does not mean 
that monetary authorities should target income inequality more explicitly or 
eventually change their mandates. Indeed, admitting these consequences 
(most of them unintended) could improve the accountability, reputation, 
credibility, and, eventually, the legitimacy of independent central bankers in 
the eyes of the citizens.
Finally, it is worth to note that the empirical research on the relationship 
between monetary policy and inequality suffers from a serious problem of 
data limitations. Particularly, further research is needed in this area with a 
view to analyzing directly the effects of monetary policy on specific groups 
of population. Such a detailed and comprehensive study would require using 
disaggregated data at household level in order to build a microdata panel for 
a given country.
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